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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 13-1283 
___________ 
 
JOSEPH LAURENSAU, 
   Appellant 
 
v. 
 
SAMUEL ROMAROWICS, CO III; MR. BARKLEY, CO 1, Property SMU; 
VINCENT KNIZER, CO II; MR. J. JOHNSON, CO I; FRANK LEWIS, Chaplain 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Western District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil No. 2:11-cv-01054) 
Magistrate Judge:  Honorable Maureen P. Kelly 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) 
or Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
May 31, 2013 
 
Before:  SCIRICA, HARDIMAN and GREENAWAY, JR., Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: June 13, 2013) 
_________ 
 
OPINION 
_________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Joseph Laurensau, a Pennsylvania inmate, appeals from the District Court’s order 
granting the defendants’ motion for summary judgment.  Because this appeal does not 
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present a substantial question, we will summarily affirm the District Court’s judgment.  
See 3d Cir. L.A.R. 27.4, I.O.P. 10.6. 
I. 
 Because we write primarily for the parties, we need only recite the background 
necessary for our discussion, and we have based the following on both Laurensau’s 
allegations and the defendants’ uncontested counter-assertions.  In 2009, while 
incarcerated at SCI Fayette, Laurensau was granted an accommodation for a Kosher diet.  
On April 21, 2009, he submitted a request that he be taken off the Kosher diet because of 
“inadequate starch;” however, he did not sign a formal release from the accommodation.  
Despite receiving warnings, Laurensau took at least two non-Kosher meals.  Knizer 
issued him a notice of non-compliance with the religious dietary accommodation rules. 
 Also in the spring of 2009, Laurensau ordered 24 erotic photographs and three “art 
books.”  The photographs were delivered but were placed with his stored property 
because of limitations on the number of photographs allowed at one time in a Restricted 
Housing Unit (“RHU”) cell.  Officers informed Laurensau of the location of the 
photographs and of the procedure he needed to follow to exchange photographs in his cell 
with those placed in storage.  The “art books” were returned to the vendor because they 
were disallowed by SCI Fayette officials. 
 Laurensau further alleges that on August 28, 2009, he received a Kosher bag with 
crushed graham crackers, no saltine crackers, and cottage cheese with saliva and chewing 
tobacco in it.  He dumped the cottage cheese on the floor, shoved it under his cell door, 
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and began to wash it away with water.  Barkley observed the water and began to shut off 
the water supply.  Laurensau then threw toilet water out of his cell, striking Barkley.  He 
was removed from his cell in a cell extraction, during which his glasses were taken as a 
safety precaution, and placed in disciplinary custody.  His glasses were returned to him 
following the cell extraction.  Laurensau was subsequently found guilty of assault and 
tampering with property.  He received 90 days of disciplinary custody and alleges that he 
was placed on a behavior modified meal for three days and was denied outdoor exercise 
and showers for seven days.  He was officially removed from the kosher diet on 
September 1, 2009. 
II. 
 We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and exercise plenary review over the 
District Court’s grant of summary judgment.  See Giles v. Kearney, 571 F.3d 318, 322 
(3d Cir. 2009).  Summary judgment is appropriate when the “movant shows that there is 
no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a 
matter of law.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).  We may summarily affirm on any basis supported 
by the record.  Murray v. Bledsoe, 650 F.3d 246, 247 (3d Cir. 2011) (per curiam). 
III. 
 Laurensau first alleges that his First Amendment rights to free exercise of religion 
were violated when officials discontinued his Kosher meals.  It is undisputed that 
Laurensau requested to be taken off the Kosher diet because he thought that it contained 
inadequate starch; however, he was not removed from the diet because he did not submit 
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his request on the proper form.  The record further shows that, on at least two occasions, 
Laurensau took a regular tray despite his continued participation in the Kosher diet.  
Given that Laurensau failed to comply with the Kosher diet, the District Court properly 
concluded that he had not demonstrated a “sincerely held” belief entitled to constitutional 
protection.
1
  DeHart v. Horn, 227 F.3d 47, 51 & n.3 (3d Cir. 2000). 
 Laurensau also alleges that his First Amendment rights were violated when the 
defendants retaliated against him for filing grievances regarding his missing mail and the 
inadequacy of his Kosher diet.  As an initial matter, filing grievances qualifies as 
constitutionally protected conduct.  See Milhouse v. Carlson, 652 F.3d 371, 373-74 (3d 
Cir. 1981); see also Rauser v. Horn, 241 F.3d 330, 333 (3d Cir. 2001) (first prong of a 
retaliation claim requires plaintiff to show that he engaged in constitutionally protected 
conduct).  However, nothing in the record suggests that Laurensau’s grievances were a 
“substantial or motivating factor” for many of his allegations of retaliation.  See Rauser, 
241 F.3d at 333.  Instead, the evidence demonstrates that Laurensau was removed from 
the Kosher diet because of his own decision to take a regular tray on at least two 
occasions, that his eyeglasses were removed for safety precautions during a cell 
extraction and returned following the extraction, and that his photographs were placed 
                                              
1
 Although we are not required to reach this issue given our conclusion that Laurensau 
failed to demonstrate a “sincerely held” belief, we agree with the District Court’s 
alternate conclusion that the defendants’ conduct in removing Laurensau from the Kosher 
diet was reasonable under the factors set forth in Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89-90 
(1987).  See DeHart, 227 F.3d at 51(noting that courts need not conduct a Turner analysis 
if a “sincerely held” religious belief is not demonstrated). 
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with his stored property because of regulations governing the number of possessions 
allowed in his RHU cell.  Furthermore, evidence that Laurensau assaulted Officer 
Barkley shows that Laurensau would have been charged regardless of any protected 
activity.  See id. at 334; see also Carter v. McGrady, 292 F.3d 152, 159 (3d Cir. 2002) 
(affirming summary judgment in favor of defendants when “the quantum of evidence 
concerning the prisoner’s misconduct showed that he would face disciplinary action 
regardless of his protected activity). 
 Laurensau also alleges several violations of his Eighth Amendment rights.  As an 
initial matter, his complaints regarding behavior modified diets, showers, and exercise do 
not rise to the level necessary to form the basis of Eighth Amendment violations.  See, 
e.g., LeMaire v. Maass, 12 F.3d 1444, 1456 (9th Cir. 1993) (use of a “temporary 
Nutraloaf diet does not deny ‘the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities’”); 
Knight v. Armontrout, 878 F.2d 1093, 1096 (8th Cir. 1989) (denial of outdoor exercise 
for thirteen days did not violate the Eighth Amendment); Davenport v. DeRobertis, 844 
F.2d 1310, 1316 (7th Cir. 1988) (limiting inmates to one shower a week does not violate 
the Eighth Amendment).  Furthermore, the District Court properly granted summary 
judgment to the defendants on Laurensau’s claim that his rights were violated by the 
contamination of his food, as the record is devoid of evidence that the defendants 
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consciously knew of and disregarded an excessive risk to Laurensau’s health.2  See 
Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 840-44 (1994). 
We have carefully considered Laurensau’s claims regarding the confiscation of his 
property and conclude that they are meritless.  Laurensau’s claim that his Fourth 
Amendment rights were violated by an allegedly unconstitutional seizure of his property 
is meritless, as “the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition on unreasonable searches does not 
apply in prison cells.”  Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 530 (1984).  Furthermore, to the 
extent that Laurensau alleges that his due process rights were violated by the confiscation 
of his property, he has an adequate post-deprivation remedy in state tort law.
3
  See id., 
468 U.S. at 533; see also 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 8522(a), (b)(3) (common law action 
for conversion); Tillman v. Lebanon Cnty. Corr. Facility, 221 F.3d 410, 422 (3d Cir. 
                                              
2
 Laurensau also claims that Officers Romarowicz and Knizer’s failure to supervise their 
subordinates or inmate workers led to the contamination of his food.  To the extent that 
his claim is based upon a theory of respondeat superior, it is barred.  See Rode v. 
Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir. 1998).  A supervisor can be held individually 
liable if his failure to properly train or supervise a subordinate caused a deprivation of the 
plaintiff’s constitutional rights.  Andrews v. Fowler, 98 F.3d 1069, 1078 (8th Cir. 1996).  
However, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the supervisor’s failure to train amounted to 
“deliberate indifference” and that the failure to train was closely related to the plaintiff’s 
injury.  City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 389, 391 (1989).  Nothing in the record 
suggests that Romarowicz and Knizer were deliberately indifferent. 
3
 We further agree with the District Court’s alternate conclusion that Laurensau failed to 
exhaust his administrative remedies for his claim regarding his missing property, as 
required under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”).  See 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a).  
Although Laurensau filed three grievances regarding his mail, he did not pursue them 
through final appeal as set forth in the Department of Corrections’ grievances procedures.  
See Williams v. Beard, 482 F.3d 637, 639 (3d Cir. 2007) (prisoner must comply with all 
administrative requirements). 
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2000) (Pennsylvania Department of Corrections grievance procedure provides adequate 
post-deprivation remedy). 
We also agree with the District Court that Laurensau’s claims that the defendants 
conspired with inmate Feola to contaminate his food and also conspired to remove him 
from the Kosher diet are meritless.  To demonstrate the existence of a conspiracy under § 
1983, “a plaintiff must show that two or more conspirators reached an agreement to 
deprive him or her of a constitutional right under color of law.”  Parkway Garage, Inc. v. 
City of Phila., 5 F.3d 685, 700 (3d Cir. 1993), abrogated on other grounds by United 
Artists Theatre Circuit, Inc. v. Twp. of Warrington, 316 F.3d 392 (3d Cir. 2003).  Our 
review of the record confirms that it supports neither Laurensau’s allegations of an 
agreement between Feola and the defendants nor his allegations that the defendants 
agreed to violate his rights by removing him from the Kosher diet. 
IV. 
 For the foregoing reasons, no substantial question is presented and we will affirm 
the judgment of the District Court.  See 3d Cir. L.A.R. 27.4; I.O.P. 10.6. 
